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Abstract  
This paper deals with a case of transnational cooperation between companies. The profile 
of cooperation between the two motor vehicle makers Skoda and the Volkswagen Group 
is reconstructed, characterised by the interlocking transformation and globalisation. 
Decisive for the success of the project was not only Volkswagen’s substantial transfer of 
know-how and management resources to the Czech manufacturer but also how it was 
approached. The utilisation of existing Škoda competencies was crucial in providing the 
stability needed for the learning process. 
The study discusses findings at three levels of integration: corporate, regional, and 
international. In contrast to the success achieved in international integration, the regional 
integration of the company has been slow. 
The authors conclude that this discrepancy was to be expected, given the unequal 
resources available to international firms and to local industry, and is not primarily to be 
explained by the tendency often attributed to so-called global strategy players of external 
concentration on the group network. The case has rather shown that limited regional 
integration has been largely due to the policy pursued by the Czech government in the 
important early years of transformation, which failed to generate the necessary domestic 
efforts in restructuring. 
 
 
 
 
“The company Skoda Auto a.s. is now not only the most successful industrial enterprise 
in the Czech Republic, it has meanwhile gained an outstanding position within the entire 
Volkswagen Group. Precisely because we are dealing with such a ‘success story,’ it seems 
appropriate to take stock of the historical and economic development of the company 
over the past ten years.” 
Dr. Klaus Pumberger, formerly of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Prague. 
 
“This essay offers a thorough analysis of the many-facetted environment and a highly 
informative account of the solutions achieved. A ‘must’ for anyone engaged in 
entrepreneurial or advisory activities in the region—also beyond big industry.” 
Dieter Mankowski, Director of the German-Czech Chamber of Industry and Commerce 
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I. Introduction 
One of the essential features of globalisation is doubtless the trend towards convergent, 
transnational developments. Paradoxically, however, the region has also become more 
important. This dual aspect of globalisation poses a considerable challenge for transition 
countries in their endeavours to catch up with international developments. And it was 
soon evident that merely converting the production system from plan to market did not 
suffice for this purpose, and that the path chosen towards modernisation often did not 
lead all the way to the goal. The industries most affected were those that had to hold 
their own in international markets. Given the intensified competition and dynamics in 
these markets, it was obvious that the companies relying solely on their own resources 
would be unable to catch up. 
In this situation, another aspect of globalisation offered unexpected help: the pressure 
for the greater international location of production. This gave transition countries the 
opportunity to stimulate restructuring through direct investment. Although investment 
from abroad offered more chance of attaining this goal, there was no guarantee that it 
would bring qualitative progress for local industries and the region. Even if globalisation 
had enhanced the general importance of the regional component with regard to both 
costs and innovation, it seemed that the cost factor would be most likely to make Eastern 
Europe interesting, and that the existing structural level of the region’s industrial culture 
would prove resilient. 
Given the asymmetric constellation, with the region’s countries and industries strongly 
dependent on the transfer of capital and know-how and a political actor weakened by 
radical systemic change, negotiating power was extremely limited, but—as developments 
have shown—far from insignificant. As the case described in this paper shows, the 
deployment of regional competence resources in setting the course for restructuring was 
an important factor. Moreover, the resulting transformation regime of enterprise, 
investor, and political actor points to two more general considerations. First, the defence 
of these interests by regional actors remains important even if the global actor also 
safeguards them and integrates local innovation potential. Second, even with an 
international player operating strongly on a regional basis, problematic disparities can 
arise if the institutional prerequisites for inter-sectoral linkages and cooperation are 
lacking. 
The paper describes and discusses the tension between global and regional networking 
and the performance of the transitional regime in the case of cooperation between the 
Czech motor vehicle manufacturer Škoda and the German Volkswagen Group.1 Even 
                                                 
1 The account is based on findings of the research unit Transformation and Globalisation at the Science 
Center Berlin and empirical surveys that the authors carried out between 1995 and 1997 at Škoda-
Volkswagen. They included intensive interviews with company experts from management (foreign and 
local executives) and with shop-floor workers. Also included were trade union representatives and 
  
 
5 
 
though we are dealing with a very high-profile enterprise, and are thus evidently 
concerned with its specificity, the informative value of the case is a great deal broader, 
precisely because of the importance of the firm to the region and because it offers an 
example of an internationalisation strategy. Our account therefore tries to strike a balance 
between ‘dense description’ and condensed problematisation. 
The paper addresses the three key relationship levels of the transformation regime, which 
set the course for cooperation. We deal firstly with the strategy level, the conditions and 
processes that led to cooperative consensus and which constitute the setting for the 
global-regional orientation. We then turn to the work level, to the implementation of 
strategy in three selected areas: products and competence development, production 
modernisation and transfer management, and with regard to the supply industry. Finally, 
we extend the perspective to the governmental actor, in order to assess, at least to some 
extent, the development of the company and the sector in comparison with national 
industry. 
 
II. The Strategy Level: Foreign Investor and Government 
1. Starting Point and General Setting 
The Market 
At a relatively early date after the socialist system foundered and the regime changed in 
1989, intensive discussions were taken up between Eastern and Western European 
motor vehicle manufacturers. In no other industrial sector were potential buyers quicker 
off the mark or production facilities so sought after for investment or takeover. The 
dynamic observable particularly among major high-volume producers was due to the new 
markets and expansion promised by the opening of the borders. Central and Eastern 
Europe offered the prospect of winning new market shares and sales in grand style—
growth unhoped for in Western motor vehicle markets owing to the prevailing strong 
international competition. 
With the dearth of vehicles in Eastern Bloc countries—there were only 2.5 million cars 
for 420 million people; 80 cars per thousand inhabitants in the East compared to 500 in 
the West—rapidly rising growth potential was expected to materialize in the course of 
‘catch-up motorisation’. It is thus not very surprising that Western motor vehicle 
manufacturers showed a strategic interest in the region at an early date, initiating 
negotiations with existing producers. After all, the car was one of the most desired 
                                                                                                                                                        
representatives from the group executive board. This paper concentrates more strongly on the strategic 
actor level and the framing of the relationship between regional and global linkages. 
It should be pointed out in advance that we refer to joint venture and cooperation in the context of 
Škoda-Volkswagen although these terms no long apply in the strict sense, takeover now being appropriate. 
However, we have continued to use the first two terms because the focus is on effective processual 
interaction rather than on formal relations. 
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consumer products, whose production had persistently lagged far behind demand 
because of the notorious systemic restrictions. Investing in manufacturers established in 
the region promised not only access to a big new market region but also major expansion 
of capacities. 
Among the foremost objects were FSM in Poland and the Czech manufacturer Škoda, 
whose privatisation offered such opportunities. The point of departure for Western 
European producers differed widely. There were differences in market entry options, in 
investment strategy, and in knowledge about the manufacturing sites concerned. The 
Italian Fiat group was in a privileged position, having long maintained relations in the 
form of licensing agreements with Poland, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia under the 
socialist regimes, and which therefore enjoyed an advantage over others in competing for 
FSM. French producers also had experience with concrete projects; Renault had invested 
in the Romanian enterprise Dacia quite some time back, and Citroën had had links with 
the Olcit works, also in Romania. The other two major manufacturers GM/Opel and 
Volkswagen, on the contrary, were largely newcomers in the transition economies. 
If one recalls the situation as it existed immediately after the political turnaround when 
investment decisions had to be made, forecasts on market development were anything 
but certain. It was not just that political and economic conditions were highly unstable; 
probably much more importantly for entrepreneurial investment projects, there was no 
reliable knowledge about inventories, plant, and utilisable resources at Eastern European 
production sites, because the countries concerned had been so comprehensively 
insulated. At the same time, the early privatisation of motor vehicle producers by the 
governments of the region and the comparatively large number of Western competitors 
exerted considerable pressure to act. This was particularly apparent in the case of Škoda, 
the second major concern available in the region after the Poles had rapidly opted for the 
established partner Fiat in the case of FSM. 
 
The Object 
The sale of Škoda involved not only the monopoly in the domestic Czech market but 
also succession to an established leading position in the other Eastern European 
countries. With regard to competence resources, too, Škoda had attracted a certain 
amount of attention among experts beyond the Eastern Bloc during the socialist period 
despite the deficiencies and backwardness of the products. The tradition of the firm as 
one of the very oldest car manufacturers in the world and the fact that the company had 
written automobile history at a very early date played a particular role in this, but there 
was more to it. Even under the socialist regime the fundamental structures of an 
independent car maker had been maintained, thus safeguarding technical standards and 
basic development. Contrary to the traditional motor vehicle makers in the old GDR, for 
example, Škoda and the Czech automotive industry suffered no comparable 
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downgrading. The company had maintained its salience in national industry, and 
accordingly enjoyed preferential investment. Škoda shared this position with other, so-
called status enterprises, which received preferential treatment under the socialist regime 
because their exports to the West earned foreign exchange. These narrow corridors 
allowed a certain transfer of know-how and permitted a marginal closing of the 
West/East technology and performance gap. Škoda’s eminent position gave a certain 
scope for ameliorating products and production structures and for maintaining its leading 
position in Eastern Europe. In comparison with FSM, producing under Western licence, 
Škoda also benefited from the outset from a higher technological level. Among Eastern 
European motor vehicle makers, Škoda thus had relatively most to offer, and in the past 
the Škoda product had managed to uphold its reputation as a comparatively reliable 
vehicle. 2 
A distinctive feature closely associated with traditional manufacturing sites—in Eastern 
Europe too—is an infrastructure of supplier and customer networks, of labour markets 
and cooperative relationships firmly established in the region. In the Czech location and 
in the region this had remained largely intact, owing to the uninterrupted—albeit 
diminished—operation of this industrial sector. The attractiveness of Škoda for foreign 
investors is therefore to be seen not only against the background of the competence the 
company already possessed; it is also due to the network of interfirm relationships and 
the regional infrastructure. 
 
The Investor 
The bid for Škoda was made while Carl Hahn still headed the VW Group. With their 
highly favourable appraisal of the Eastern Europe market—there was talk of an 
‘unparalleled megamarket’3—top management also signalled the group’s determination 
and interest in continuing the consistent improvement of Volkswagen’s strategic market 
position in Europe with the acquisition of Škoda. Hahn’s assessment drew particularly on 
the prospect of succeeding to the traditional Czech manufacturer’s leading position in 
East-Central and Eastern Europe, and his eye was thus primarily on Škoda. With the 
explicit purpose of expanding Volkswagen’s strategic market position in mind, he visited 
the region early in 1990 at the head of an expert delegation from the Federation of 
German Industry, using the occasion to indicate his interest in investing. 
                                                 
2 During the socialist period Škoda had been present on some Western markets (including Britain) with 
the model Favorit—of course, only in small numbers and at dumping prices. This “narrow window on the 
West” is likely to have given considerable stimulus to product development. Cooperation with Porsche 
and Bertone lent targeted impetus to design development at Škoda before 1989. The resulting 
improvements in products are likely to have been important in maintaining the level of Western exports. 
3 Hahn in Berliner Zeitung, 11 December 1990. According to optimistic estimates, demand was expected 
to rise to about ten million cars within ten years (die tageszeitung, 11 December 1990). 
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In 1990, at the time of the planned projects in the transition countries, the Volkswagen 
Group was at an historic peak in the world market. Not only had it passed the mark of 
three million cars sold, maintaining its fourth rank among major manufacturers after 
General Motors, Ford, and Toyota,4 Volkswagen was also number one in the European 
market for the sixth time in a row. Full order books and long delivery times were signs of 
persistently strong demand for all three brands, VW, Audi, and Seat. In terms of sales 
and turnover, 1990 was the most successful business year to date in the history of the 
company.5 
Operating from a position of strategic market power and strength, and mindful that 
failing to take action risked abandoning Eastern Europe to its direct competitors,6 
Volkswagen tackled the envisaged investment projects in East Germany and in the CSFR 
relatively soon after the opening of the borders. In the context of a DM 5 billion 
investment programme, two new VW plants were set up in the former Trabant combines 
in East Germany,7 followed shortly afterwards by the much bigger Škoda project to the 
tune of DM 9 million. 
Commitment to establishing group manufacturing sites in the transition countries was 
considered important not only to gain strategic access through early market entry, but 
also because the situation in Western markets was increasingly difficult. After almost a 
decade of prosperity, a downturn was expected in the group’s Western markets for the 
90s. The locations in Eastern Europe and the strong development of sales expected in 
that region were thus also seen as an opportunity to compensate the likely decline in the 
West in not inconsiderable measure through new projects in the East, thus improving the 
overall costs position. 
Generally speaking, the Hahn era at Volkswagen was dominated by the strategic goal of 
internationalisation. Under his leadership Volkswagen plants were build in South 
                                                 
4 In 1986 the Japanese car maker Nissan had been displaced from 4th rank. The new goal was to overtake 
the global player Toyota. 
5 The point needs to be relativized. For the success story production figures and turnover seemed to tell 
was belied by the development of the concern’s earnings position. The discrepancy between these two 
factors is indicative of increasing cost competition and inefficient production structures, closely associated 
with the Japanese challenge and the ‘lean production’ concept, which imposed fundamental rationalisation 
and modernisation on the Western automotive industry as a whole (on the VW path see Jürgens 1998). 
6 In comments on these investment projects made by Hahn at the time and more recently, considerable 
emphasis was placed on the possibility of obtaining a leading position in Eastern Europe for the group 
through Škoda (interview with Hahn, 16 January 1996). For Hahn this was not one option among many 
that could also be taken up later. He saw the opening up of Eastern Europe as an historical opportunity. 
In such a situation he felt it would be a mistake not to act or to do so only hesitantly. “When a world is on 
the move … you have to go along with it. The risk of missing out on these developments is much greater 
than that of helping to shape them” (quoted in Die Zeit, 14 December 1990). The main competitors 
involved were the two high-volume producers Fiat and Renault. Fiat had to be overtaken, since the Italian 
group was already established in the region—in Poland and the USSR, and Renault proved to be the main 
rival for Škoda (see below). 
7 A complete new car factory for the VW models Polo and Golf was constructed in Mosel close to 
Zwickau, and the modernisation of existing engines was located in Chemnitz. 
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America, China, and Europe. Volkswagen thus gained competence in internationalisation 
at an early date, which still today distinguishes the group from many other Western 
European producers.8 This being the case, it is not surprising that Eastern Europe was 
given extremely high priority under Hahn after the opening up of the region. In a brief 
span of time, a whole series of investment projects emerged in addition to those in East 
Germany and the Škoda plans, in Slovakia, Poland and Bosnia. A little later, the 
subsidiary Audi invested in Hungary. In terms of the total amount spent, VW was the 
biggest investor in the regions in its sector. 
In considering the motives for the accelerated expansion of the group in the transition 
countries under Hahn, one final aspect concerning the internationalisation concept in a 
qualitative sense needs to be stressed. Basically, the VW approach to internationalisation 
followed a pattern of ‘equality among production locations.’9 The core element of the 
concept is that the decentralised foreign manufacturing sites were not integrated into the 
classical division of labour between centre and periphery—with corresponding gradation. 
A guiding factor was to develop or maintain basic core functions at all production sites. 
The philosophy of equality was associated with the fundamental facilitation of upgrading 
for industrially backward manufacturing regions and a preference for tying in with 
decentralised, regionally established networking and relationship structures. As we will 
show, the two elements were to prove important factors in the Škoda negotiations and 
for the further development of the company in the cooperation project. From the point 
of view of the VW Group, promoting equality for less developed sites was motivated not 
only by the new combination of costs and quality competition in the markets, but also by 
the desire to create and exploit competition between manufacturing locations within the 
group. While Hahn still placed greater stress on securing a broad innovation potential, 
under his successor Piëch the focus shifted more strongly to generating synergies 
through interaction between sites. However, the internationalisation approach with its 
comparatively strong basis in competence has been retained. Equality was indispensable 
if the new manufacturing locations were to participate increasingly in demanding 
development and production projects.10 And this provided the basis for the wider use of 
the more flexible group-wide division of labour provided by greater standardisation and 
technological networking for qualitative processes and innovations—a flexibilization 
                                                 
8 This is also true of other up-market German manufacturers like BMW and Mercedes, which, unlike 
Volkswagen, internationalised production only very late in the day. Internationally, however, the German 
and European automotive industries as a whole still lag far behind the Americans and Japanese. 
9 Cf. Hahn interview 16 January 1996. Of course, this does not mean homogeneity in the sense of 
absolutely equal status, but the option of development beyond the mere low cost/low skill/low tech 
specification. 
10 An example of such upgrading is offered by the VW plant in Mexico, which was given the contract for 
the new Beetle—a product intended for the American and Western European markets. 
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that, through this qualitatively expanded competitive mechanism, blurred the traditional 
dividing line between high-cost central regions and low-cost peripheral regions.11 
 
2. Negotiations on Cooperation  
Preferences 
The rapid privatisation of Škoda through sale to a foreign investor was in one way 
untypical of the Czech approach to transformation. For, in contrast to neighbouring 
countries, the Czech government did not pursue any sort of incentive policy to attract 
foreign direct investment, having instead specifically espoused a national strategy for the 
restructuring of core industries. If Škoda was treated differently than, for example, 
mechanical engineering firms, it is probably due to the realisation that, without external 
help, it would not be possible to position the firm rapidly in a sector with strong 
international integration and subject to global competition. Furthermore, Škoda is a very 
small enterprise by international standards—with a capacity of 180,000 vehicles—and it 
was probable that, in view of the emerging consolidation in the automotive industry, it 
would be unable to hold its own as an independent manufacturer. An international 
solution was therefore sought for this sector from the very outset.12 
Volkswagen was not the only Western car maker interested in taking over Škoda. Others 
included Volvo, General Motors, and Renault. Only two stayed the course, and the 
competition between them was correspondingly fierce: the French concern Renault and 
the German Volkswagen Group. In the Czech camp, preferences were divided between 
the two. The political leadership, including President Havel, were strongly in favour of 
cooperating with the French. There is every reason to think that political motives played 
a role in this preference. For at this early stage the Czech attitude towards Germany and 
the Germans was generally still very critical, and broad sections of society had great 
reservations about the neighbours.13It was feared that a German takeover of the 
                                                 
11 Intragroup competition and the flexible division of labour, which, from the viewpoint of the less 
developed and backward production sites doubtless constitute a desirable upgrading option, quite clearly 
present the traditionally highly developed high-cost manufacturing centres with the prospect of 
competence loss. The globalisation metaphor for increasing locational competition therefore conceals not 
only the ‘simple’ production cost factor—which is the general view—but also a possible setback in the 
level of development achieved in the old industrial regions. Playing locations off against one another, 
especially in the field of core competencies, can be considered one of the main problems currently facing 
trade unions, and which has led to new supraregional mergers like European and world-wide employee 
councils. For more details on this general problem see Dörr/Kessel 1999b. 
12 Apart from Škoda, this also affected the second Czech car maker Tatra. The firm’s cooperation with an 
American company failed, however, and car production under this brand name is now at an end. 
13 These reservations go back to experience during and after the war in both countries—the Munich 
Agreement, Nazi occupation, the later expulsion of the Sudeten Germans—and to the extreme difficulty 
in achieving political understanding after the change in regime. There was also uneasiness about the 
reunified Germany as a political and economic ‘major power’ in Europe, while the secession of Slovakia 
from the Czechoslovakia state made the country even smaller (the final separation came at the end of 
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renowned and time-honoured enterprise Škoda would revive old tensions and conflicts. 
The Czech leadership elite14 is likely to have had a quite different but also obvious reason 
for preferring the French buyer, namely Renault’s state governance regime. From a 
socialist perspective, (stronger) state management was generally to be seen as more 
appropriate than a purely private regime for major companies so prominent in the 
national economy. The French are therefore not unlikely to have advanced this argument 
during negotiations, especially since President Mitterand and representatives of the 
department of industry also intervened personally in Prague. 
The German Volkswagen Group had the support of the more enterprise-oriented actors, 
in the first place the Škoda workforce itself, as well as the union and—with effective 
public impact—the Czech press. This grouping shared a conviction that only a 
“genuinely” economic solution would strengthen the position of the enterprise, and that 
this was the only way to regain international competitiveness. This camp did not expect 
the ‘state enterprise’ Renault to press ahead with decentralised company structures but 
rather to continue the ‘state subsidy culture’ unlikely to attain genuinely corporate 
objectives or to cope effectively with competition. 
Negotiations were not made any easier by the differences in strategic preference among 
the Czechs, with those in favour of the state-political solution arguing for greater 
economic responsibility while the other side warned about the dangers of subsidies and 
stagnation; and with the advocates of an entrepreneurial solution pleading for 
development and competitiveness while others pointed to the risks of competition and a 
loss of autonomy. Moreover, apart from the hard facts of investment and restructuring 
programmes, these legitimation discourses were pivotal in the decision-making process. 
Negotiations were protracted owing to the even match between bidders, the ambivalence 
of Czech preferences, and prevailing reservations and uncertainties—with the positive 
effect for the Czechs of higher offers and repeated outbidding between the two 
competitors. What finally tipped the balance in favour of Volkswagen was an extremely 
high investment programme of over DM 9 billion. The proposed Renault programme 
had amounted to ‘no more than’ DM 5 billion. The fact that Renault ultimately 
attempted to compensate the much higher German offer with additional non-monetary 
incentives—there was talk of oil supplies and cooperation in the nuclear power 
business—shows the strategic importance attributed to the Czech company in the 
Eastern European market. Volkswagen’s high investment and the associated double 
promise it offered of international competitiveness and greater corporate competence 
made it easy for the Czech government to abandon its earlier preference for Renault. 
Moreover, the demand of the Škoda workforce for an economic solution exerted 
considerable legitimation pressure. Škoda workers threatened strike and resistance if 
                                                                                                                                                        
1992). 
14 If the Czech leadership elite is spoken of in general in this context, this is not to imply that there were 
no differences of opinion within the group. However, the majority showed a preference for Renault. 
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Renault were to be chosen. The overwhelming vote of Škoda employees was influenced 
not only by the economically more advantageous VW offer but also by the better social 
benefits and pay VW generally provided. 
 
Persuasion 
There were factors over and above economic issues in the narrow sense that tipped the 
scales in favour of VW, and which largely centred on the person of the chief German 
negotiator, CEO Hahn. 
In strong contrast to Renault, the German side was represented in the negotiations by a 
high-ranking delegation of industrial representatives headed by Hahn himself. The 
emphasis was thus clearly on demonstrating economic competence. The change of mind 
on the part of the Czech government is likely to have been influenced not inconsiderably 
by the business ethics orientation which became clear in the course of talks. One point 
marking the turnaround is a speech held by Hahn in which he pleaded the VW case, not 
without convincing references to the country and its people, and in which he expressed 
his high regard for Czech industrial competence and Czech motor vehicle 
manufacturing.15 In stressing the value of Škoda’s corporate tradition, and the 
competence of the company’s engineers and skilled workers, VW management addressed 
a collective identity aspect important to the Czechs, especially considering the high 
symbolic value of Škoda for the country over and above the enterprise itself. 
In this case, cultural recognition was extremely important. In the presentations and 
negotiations on the Volkswagen project it was essential to keep the politically difficult 
German-Czech relations constantly in mind. It was not only necessary to gain approval 
for the investment and restructuring project, and of course to have the means and will to 
carry it through. The basic trust of the Czech side had to be won. And in the person of 
Carl Hahn, Volkswagen had an important agent for this type of ‘trust capital.’ Two 
elements in particular spoke for the credibility of the position presented. First, the image 
of the German automotive industry, the international reputation of German technology 
and quality production, which was enjoyed not only by German prestige manufacturers 
but also by Volkswagen, the high-volume makers of the ‘People’s Car.’ In other words, 
Volkswagen’s company history itself authenticated the professions of respect for 
engineering competence and the maintenance of technological development in strong 
congruence with Czech value orientations. 
                                                 
15 In the literature on international management, increasing weight is being put on the importance of 
competence in establishing a relationship with the history and culture of the host country and taking them 
into account in any action envisaged. Technical-economic ‘tunnel vision’ in managerial action—
‘management without culture’ as it were—is identified as a fundamental inadequacy and the cause of high 
social costs. On the relevance of ‘intercultural competence’ cf. Bolten 1995. 
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The second important circumstance was that Hahn could cite Seat as an impressive 
demonstration of VW’s competence in restructuring a state enterprise. At this point in 
time, the Spanish subsidiary Seat was still indisputably and demonstrably a critical project 
that had been successfully mastered. It could serve as evidence that the group was really 
determined to respect the structures of an established manufacturing company and to 
preserve the brand tradition. The example of Seat also vouched for Volkswagen’s 
willingness to make substantial transfers in the course of a takeover, for in this case a 
similar investment programme had already been largely realised and the enterprise 
modernised in line with German quality and technology standards.16 Seat, like Škoda, had 
been a relatively small producer unable to finance development on its own, and which, 
after being taken over by VW, had become an internationally competitive brand of the 
group. The analogy with Seat was thus a further convincing argument for the seriousness 
of the project that was able to allay fears of Škoda being downgraded. 
 
Agreements 
A similarly decisive factor was the restructuring concept agreed along with the 
investment programme. It was perhaps still more important than the mere dimensions of 
investment in defeating the Renault bid. No comparable agreement had been reached 
with Renault on restructuring goals that the Czechs considered fundamental. The Czech 
government had made the sale conditional on a commitment by the investor to obviate 
mere ‘catch-up modernisation’ let alone downgrading. (The imposition of such 
conditions on the foreign investor depends very strongly on the type of investment 
envisaged, whether equity stake/cooperation, take-over, or so-called greenfield 
investment. In the last case the investor is usually least bound by such conditions, and if 
at all they are usually part of the ‘subsidy pact’ and are not concerned with production in 
the narrower sense but with job-creation associated with the investment. In the case of a 
purchase or participation in existing manufacturing operations, such conditions are usual. 
That such far-reaching demands could be made in the case of Škoda is indicative of the 
company’s leading position in national industry and that the enterprise was very attractive 
for Western European car makers with ambitions in the Eastern European market). 
There were essentially three demands: 
 to safeguard the status of the firm as a full car maker and to continue the historic 
Škoda brand; 
                                                 
16 All Seat plants were modernised and a new factory was built, and, in particular, the product range was 
renewed. VW’s took over Seat in the mid-80s. The two firms had previously cooperated in development 
after the long-standing partner FIAT had withdrawn in 1980, and the Spanish company needed a new 
partner for technology transfers. In return, Seat produced VW models (Polo) and made the existing 
Spanish service network available, giving VW entry to the Spanish market (FAZ 17 September 1993, SZ 
11 December 1986). 
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 to involve and safeguard the regional supplier sector in the Škoda restructuring and 
modernisation programme; 
 and to pursue a strategy of capacity expansion and innovation enabling Škoda to meet 
international competition and ensure its long-term survival as a motor vehicle 
manufacturer. 
This last condition required adoption of a restructuring concept involving no serious job 
losses. Over and beyond the interest in maintaining employment levels, it was also a 
question of preserving existing competence and accumulated knowledge for the 
continued expansion of production.17 
Renault’s unwillingness to make notable concessions in negotiating these conditions left 
the impression that a takeover by Renault would not so much benefit the Czech 
production site but—very much in line with the centralised national strategy 
characteristic of the French company—serve to strengthen the parent group on its home 
ground, a strategy that raised fears at Škoda that the Czech firm could find itself reduced 
to a mere assembly-supplier operation. In the worst case scenario the status quo would 
be not even be maintained and structures and competence lost that had been the 
resources for generating autonomous development capacities. 
The weight placed on these considerations by the Czech government was, however, also 
due to another factor. The manufacture of motor vehicles is a key industry in the 
country, with Škoda as the core element. Cutting the company’s regional and network 
ties, or, vice versa, severing regional components suppliers from their established 
customer would necessarily erode both Škoda and the supply industry, provoking serious 
dequalification and deindustrialization. East Germany offers a graphic example of such a 
course of events: the strategy of separating out core competencies from industrial sectors 
and dissolving networks important to enterprises and production engendered a process 
of industrial disintegration there that assumed the dimensions of radical 
deindustrialization involving the loss of existing resources, which are now no longer 
available for restructuring. 
In contrast, the restructuring and modernisation concept proposed by Volkswagen, 
which envisaged a substantial increase in capacity with a view to market expansion in 
Eastern Europe and market entry in Western Europe, implied not only preservation and 
catch-up modernisation but also the need to upgrade the products and production 
structures of the manufacturer and regional suppliers. This strategic intention of the 
German investor made it possible for the Czech side to reach agreement more easily and 
on a more consensual basis with VW than with Renault, and an agreement taking 
                                                 
17 This demand was unacceptable to General Motors, for example. The American producer believed that 
what Škoda needed first of all was to downsize the workforce, which was much too high by Western 
standards. In 1990, 21,000 workers at Škoda produced 183,000 vehicles. This was five times the standard 
GM level, so that the demand to maintain manning levels put an end to negotiations. 
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account of these considerations was in fact concluded. And in view of the rapid 
expansion of production planned—it was to be doubled to 400,000 units, a target met in 
the sixth year of cooperation—the transitional phase was not expected to last very long, 
so that the demand to maintain manning levels was not an insurmountable obstacle for 
Volkswagen. 
In return, the Czech government offered Škoda-Volkswagen an institutional ‘framework’ 
to reduce costs and protect against competing foreign products on the domestic Czech 
market. In the form of special terms, it consisted largely of customs relief and tax 
exemptions for technical equipment and components and an import duty policy that 
offered improved Škoda products produced with VW know-how market protection 
against imported vehicles for a period limited to four years. 
 
3. Governance and Regulation 
The major investment programme that won the day for Volkswagen in the competition 
to take over Škoda received a great deal of attention from the international press and 
from the motor vehicle industry in Western Europe. The Škoda project was a clear signal 
at an early date that Volkswagen’s strategic intention was to become market leader in 
Eastern Europe. The privatising policy adopted by the then Czech government at the 
very outset of transformation facilitated Volkswagen’s rapid entry. Even if participation 
initially took the form of an only 30% minority holding, the takeover was contractually 
agreed from the beginning, and the German investor had the prerogative to make 
strategic decisions. In a five-year transitional phase, it was planned to raise VW’s stake to 
70% in 1995 with a later option for the remaining shares. 
This procedure of step by step participation culminating in a controlling interest for 
Volkswagen and which left the majority of shares in the hands of the Czech government 
in the initial phase proved advantageous in a number of ways. In this period the Czech 
side retained important monitoring powers over the modernisation agreements, while the 
undertaking to grant VW a majority interest largely eliminated the uncertainty that usually 
arises in ‘open cooperation’ projects, and which often makes productive and effective 
dealings difficult. This structure obviated the danger of a know-how drain to potential 
competitors—which often occurs in fixed-term and project-related ventures—and 
allowed an intensive transfer and exchange. Moreover, no uncontrolled and unapproved 
deviation from the contractual agreements was possible. In the notoriously problematic 
initial phase of joint ventures18 when understanding has to be achieved, when the trust 
needed for implementing the project has to be established, such structures can be 
important correctives, as in the case described. 
                                                 
18 The M&A literature shows that the majority of projects fail in the initial phase. Omissions, lack of 
transparency, deficient integration management, and inadequate communication are cited as the main 
reasons for the frequent failure (on the integration problem cf. the overview by Dörrenbacher et al 1997). 
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Crisis 
In 1992/93 the worldwide recession in the motor vehicle industry and the change in the 
leadership of the VW Group caused radical changes in the Škoda/Volkswagen project 
and prompted a very serious conflict, which put cooperation under lasting strain. In 
reaction to the market slump, which hit Volkswagen particularly badly, the top 
controlling body at VW, the supervisory board, demanded a cut in the group’s 
investment plans. The measure was to apply for all group manufacturing locations. 
However, the newest projects in the East were worst affected. In contrast to the older 
and established production sites, the Eastern projects—a good two years after the 
opening of the borders—were still in their infancy. The not inconsiderable investment 
projects seemed eminently suitable for cuts, because they offered the greatest potential 
for savings. The big Škoda project was particularly targeted, ultimately suffering a 
DM 6 billion cut to DM 3.5 billion. 
Škoda was hit by this drastic reduction in the third year of the joint venture, in the 
medium-term investment planning for the period between 1994 and 1998. The cuts led 
not only to irritation and tension between the two parties but also to a serious conflict. 
The Czech government was under strong public pressure to bring its position as majority 
shareholder to bear and insist on the agreements been fulfilled. The conflict developed 
into the biggest and most serious to date in the history of the Škoda/VW venture. 
It is remarkable that no breach in relations took place, for the statements of the time 
reveal a profound crisis of trust. Naturally, the violence of Czech reactions was due 
primarily to concern about the further development of an industry so important for the 
country, and which had always been very dependent on the one enterprise Škoda. 
Furthermore, Škoda was regarded as a genuinely Czech company, and the country was 
confronted by the fact that Škoda was now embedded in a superordinate group context 
and directly affected by problems caused elsewhere. This was articulated in the demand 
that Škoda should not be made ‘liable’ for the difficulties of the group. From this point 
of view, the conflict also demonstrated the new experience that Škoda was no longer an 
independent company in the traditional sense, being integrated into a group and thus 
tied—for better or for worse—to the overall destiny of that group. 
If a breach was nevertheless avoided, it was probably due to the high-flying strategic 
goals of both sides—the Czechs sought international competitiveness and access to 
Western markets, and VW wanted to become established in the Eastern European 
market and succeed to Škoda’s leading position in the region—and to the implicitly 
shared conviction that these ambitions could best be attained with each other. The 
changes, improvements, and visible progress in development already achieved in the few 
years of the undertaking played a not inconsiderable role. For example, the then Czech 
minister of industry was of the opinion that no Czech product had to date experienced 
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such development as the Škoda product, and that it would be a hazardous step 
backwards for the company to change partners at this stage (Dlouhy in FAZ 25 April 
1994). 
 
Conflict Regime 
The irritation with and criticism provoked by the immense cutback in investment were 
nonetheless great. The situation was exacerbated by an omission on the part of the new 
VW leadership under Ferdinand Piëch. High-handedly and without consulting the main 
actors involved, Piëch stopped a major European loan of DM 1.4 billion for the Škoda-
VW project, doing so immediately before the signing date for the agreement.19  
Even if the economic losses suffered by Volkswagen made the revision and downsizing 
of investment plans appear inevitable, the way the VW Group management went about it 
was interpreted as contempt of the other actors involved and an objective breach of 
contract and trust. The high-handedness of the proceedings was particularly offensive 
considering that, at this point in time, the Czech government still held the majority of 
shares in the company.20  
The affront was levelled not only at the Czech government as VW’s partner in 
cooperation but also at the international banks involved as major financiers, and, not 
least of all, at the local Škoda management. Like the government and the banks, the 
Škoda-VW board of management had not been fully involved in the decision, but, unlike 
the other players, it gave its loyal and active support. In this situation the key German 
representative in the Škoda management, deputy chairman of the board Köhler made an 
energetic effort to win the support of the relevant circles. He argued that the decisive 
factor was not the amount invested but the concrete implementation of the project, 
claiming that Volkswagen had never called this in question.21  
                                                 
19 The robust approach of the new Volkswagen CEO in the matter of investment cuts at the very 
beginning of his term of office prefigured the future strategy and leadership pattern, which gave 
precedence to cost efficiency—a pattern that was to become predominant throughout the group in 
association with the name Piëch. 
20 Czech opinion was divided on whether the cuts constituted a breach of contract. Particularly the 
economists among the critics conceded that strategies and investments could not be handled without 
reference to the general economic situation, and did not regard the cuts as a breach of contract in the 
narrower sense of the term. However, this conflict revealed another point, namely that the components of 
the agreements differed widely in their binding force. The economic-strategic components were flexible, 
the political were binding. In the situation that had now arisen, the Czech side found itself at a 
disadvantage, and recognition that the agreements concluded differed in binding force had not prevented 
the Czech government from bringing the binding elements into play as flexible components. For example, 
it threatened to rescind the brand protection for Škoda for foreign cars. 
21 In press releases issued by Škoda the investment cuts were not mentioned. The restructuring project was 
not called in question, but it was claimed that  “such high financing from outside sources” as originally 
planned was no longer needed (cf. FAZ 18 September 1993). 
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The banks also reacted very negatively, for the Škoda-Volkswagen financing credit they 
had provided was considered a model for participation in a major European project. 47 
banks had contributed, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). It had been the bank’s biggest private project to date. And for 
the first time banks had been involved that had never financed Eastern European 
projects. This constellation lent the Škoda-Volkswagen project international repute and 
was a positive signal to other investors to support such private large-scale projects in the 
region. The back-pedalling by VW management and the form it assumed—taking place 
shortly before the signing of an agreement that had taken over two years to elaborate and 
by cursory announcement that the group’s progress in productivity had rendered the 
agreement unnecessary—was considered a provocative violation of the standards 
prevailing in the international business world, and as harmful for the development of 
confidence among Western investors for future commitments in the transition countries. 
The investment cuts and cancellation of the bank loan heavily damaged not only relations 
at the corporate strategy level but also cooperation at the operative plant level. 
Substantial political harm had also been done. The reaction of the Czech media made 
this abundantly evident, which now revised their initially favourable attitude towards the 
German Volkswagen Group as a partner for Škoda. The German side had now earned 
itself an extremely critical and distrustful press for the foreseeable future, which would 
associate developments at Škoda that were in any way ambiguous with severe negative 
consequences for the company. This situation demanded considerably more caution on 
the part of local German executives in their endeavours to regain lost trust than had 
hitherto been imposed by the difficult German-Czech relations in and after the war. 
One of the most important effects of the conflict was to politicise the project to a much 
greater degree. The Czech side now demanded renegotiation of existing agreements, and 
made their consent to the planned acquisition by Volkswagen of a controlling interest 
contingent on the agreed modernisation goals actually being attained. Moreover, the 
supplemental agreement was accompanied by a strengthening of the Czech government’s 
rights of control and co-determination in the key corporate governance body, the 
supervisory board. The legitimation needed and finally achieved for the investment cuts 
also demanded of Volkswagen that it accept an amendment to the agreement by which 
the fundamental ‘Škoda terms,’ such as the preservation of the company as a motor 
vehicle manufacturer, were reaffirmed. This had become necessary once the severe cuts 
in capital spending had rekindled the old but not extinguished fears that Škoda could 
after all lose its status as a manufacturer to become a mere assembly plant and supplier 
for the VW Group. The supplemental agreement therefore sought to bind the industrial 
agent more strongly and to maintain government influence after Volkswagen had 
acquired control. The reaffirmation of the agreed modernisation path and the 
strengthening of Czech control rights in corporate governance structures established 
important integrational institutions for cooperation intended to allay the uncertainty 
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about the future development of Škoda caused by the conflict. That the failure of the 
project could be avoided and both institutional safeguards and new consensus achieved 
on strategic procedure was ultimately also possible because the German group 
management was ready and willing to abide by the fundamental objectives agreed for 
Škoda. The stronger say of the Czech side in the intrinsically asymmetrical cooperation 
with VW is also to be seen against the background that, at this point in time, substantial 
transfers had already taken place, and a withdrawal would have brought considerable 
losses for the group—in capital and in image.22  
 
New Consensus 
The group reacted to the crisis by a comprehensive cost-cutting strategy. Škoda was 
obliged to pursue its objectives by different, less costly means. But this did not mean that 
a purely cost-induced strategy, as often found in so-called low-wage locations, was to be 
implemented but that the crisis had necessitated re-evaluation of the specific locational 
profile, the combination of low costs and high skills. Strategy was redirected in three 
major areas. 
 Technical equipment: less capital-goods-intensive production. Doing without highly 
automatized production brought savings primarily through lower capital costs, but also 
through the broader use of the specific locational advantage of low labour costs.  
 Supplies: orientation towards local component suppliers and less foreign procurement. 
Reducing imports of intermediate goods from the West was intended to bring savings 
through greater regional exploitation of the locational advantage in labour costs.  
 Group division of labour: a flexible form of joint production. The aim in this field was to 
increase synergy effects within the group through far-reaching standardisation in 
products and the restructuring of development and production functions. The savings at 
Škoda affected aspects of research and development and involved forgoing the 
construction of a new engine plant. 
The pursuit of modernisation under the condition of drastic cost cutting did not meet 
with equal Czech approval in all three areas. The continued firm commitment to cutting-
edge technologies at a world market level meant that less automation was basically 
uncontroversial, and the greater involvement of local suppliers was warmly greeted—
which is not surprising, because this point had been one of the major interests in 
cooperating with Volkswagen. But this could not be said of changes in the division of 
labour between the group and the Czech location. Since it required Škoda to outsource 
basic production tasks and functions, the new division of labour met with a great deal of 
                                                 
22 Cf. Prahalad/Doz 1987, 90 on the weakness of national governments’ negotiating position vis-à-vis 
transnational groups prior to investment and its relative strength in safeguarding local interests once 
investment has been realised.  
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reservation and dissatisfaction. It was feared that it marked the beginning of the erosion 
of Škoda’s status as a manufacturer and the possible permanent loss of core 
competencies. This has remained a fierce point of conflict with the group.  
Before going into detail on the individual points, the overriding aspects of the revised 
strategy need to be outlined. From the governance perspective the balance had shifted 
between regional responsiveness (divergence) and global integration (convergence). 
While the cost-cutting strategy (point one) markedly strengthened convergence by 
reducing Škoda’s autonomy and responsibilities, the cost pressure on the group (points 
two and three) enhanced the value-added advantage of the company over Western 
production sites offered by Škoda’s low-cost/high-skill structure. At present the 
restrictions imposed therefore seem to be more in the nature of a temporary trade-off for 
the Czech company than a general barrier to development. 
 
III. The Work Level: Group and Local Company 
A particularity in the local implementation of strategic goals needs to be stressed. A sort 
of ‘transitional safeguard’ for existing basic operational know-how was generated. Goal 
attainment was tied in with existing structures and realised step by step, in two phases. 
This was because no strategic priority was given to micro-economic rationality to the 
exclusion of qualitative structures and resources. There was thus no strategy to dismantle 
functional areas and to subject them to economic efficiency criteria, let alone to spin off 
areas considered unproductive or less productive, as often happens in the case of 
Western takeovers.23 On the contrary, the preservation and integrity of the company’s 
core areas were prioritised. From a procedural point of view, this meant reinforcing 
existing operational strengths through optimisation and improvement, and, in a second 
step, tackling more fundamental innovations over and above the status quo. This 
provided a bridge for the central operational base structures, which permitted the 
company to take the next major step in modernisation towards attaining international 
competitiveness. 
As we have seen, this phased and gradual procedure in restructuring Škoda had two 
important prerequisites: first, that there were locally developed industrial structures that 
could provide a point of departure for modernisation, and second, that the investor—
                                                 
23 This strategy predominated in privatisation and restructuring policy in East German industry, 
in which the government privatisation agency Treuhand assumed a sort of appraiser  role, and 
where little account was taken of the type of enterprise. The absence of ‘transitional safeguards’, 
understood as the preservation of basic competencies through the critical phase made a not 
insubstantial contribution to deindustrialization. Underlying this strategy were notoriously not 
only political motives but also the competitive interests of West German industry, which had 
high overcapacities itself at the time, and was therefore anxious to combat potential East German 
competition. On the East German problem of industrial modernisation see Hilpert (1997). 
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particularly the head of the VW Group Hahn, who had initiated the project—appreciated 
the industrial potential of the company, and that the priorities to be set took into account 
not only the cost-oriented marketing aspect but also the available resources of evolved 
know-how and tradition. In other words, the independent development capacity of the 
manufacturing site needed to be fully respected. If this course was considered 
strategically important for Škoda, too, it was because, in view of the Japanese challenge, 
the strengthening of local competencies in manufacturing and engineering was 
considered vital to survival in the face of international innovation competition in the 
industry.  
If, despite the greater attention to the cost principle that the crisis had imposed, VW did 
in fact adopt this qualitative strategy, it was attributable firstly to the terms of the 
cooperation agreements, which had stipulated as the guiding principle of the 
modernisation programme that the manufacturing competencies of Škoda and its 
suppliers were to be preserved, and, secondly to the realisation that any deviation would 
seriously jeopardise the project, as the conflict provoked by the investment cuts had 
shown. In the case of Škoda, the agreement thus excluded adoption of a ‘simple’ Western 
transfer, generally considered the easier and much less expensive procedure. If, despite 
the much more difficult situation, this was not considered, it was probably also because 
of growing competition in costs and quality in the early 90s. By that time it was already 
clear that, in a sector like the automotive industry that was exposed to strong global 
competition, the traditional cost strategies for less developed regions would come up 
against limits. With the general liberalisation of markets and the foreseeable inflow of 
Western products into Eastern European markets, it became evident that importing 
‘obsolescent’ products and production models—as had been done in the 80s in China—
could be only a very short-lived solution. A two-phase modernisation strategy like the 
one adopted for Škoda was therefore particularly appropriate in the face of the 
worsening cost and quality problems on the markets and within the group. It meant that 
Škoda products and structures could be optimised in a more cost-effective manner that 
both retained markets and the established clientele in the region and, because of the 
stronger regional base structures, provided a good starting point for the next and greater 
innovation phase.  
 
1. Products and Competence Development 
Quality improvement was the guiding principle. It applied for both existing products and 
for the production system, including the local supplying industry, and constituted the 
core of the cooperative optimisation and innovation strategies. 
With the decision to retain Škoda as a brand company, and to continue production of the 
Škoda product line, product improvement focused primarily on broadening sales 
potential in the firm’s established Eastern markets and on strengthening customer 
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loyalty. Škoda products’ comparatively good reputation in the former Eastern Bloc 
countries for technical standard and reliability was first of all to be reinforced by the new 
status of Škoda as a VW brand and the know-how transfer from the group. At the same 
time, however, competing Western-standard products had to be expected as the Eastern 
European market opened up, and significant progress was needed to defend the 
company’s market lead. Even if the purchasing power in the Eastern European transition 
economies was still extremely low for Western cars, the emerging used car market alone 
constituted not inconsiderable competition. This was clear, for example, from the 
protection the Czech government granted the domestic market for a number of years, 
imposing higher import duties on foreign products.24  
The product improvement strategy, traditionally designed to optimise the most authentic 
of Škoda models, the Forman, sought to develop a new product line in the small car 
segment. In only the fourth year of the joint venture a successor model was put on the 
market. It can be regarded as the first joint Škoda-VW model (Felicia). It was followed by 
other variants, and now, in 1999, by a further change in the model range. These 
developments show that the Czech product offered a good technical basis and a potential 
for development, which was indeed exploited. From the point of view of quality 
improvement, however, a new stage has now been reached. While the first successor 
model had still been based on Škoda know-how, this is no longer the case with the 
second successor model to come.25 The outcome and course of product development 
have become very important among employees from the point of view of identity and 
recognition. The fact that the successor products to come out of the joint venture were 
based on Škoda competence and were further developed in cooperation with VW has 
contributed considerably to acceptance of the project by the workforce and to their 
willingness to adjust, and has underpinned cooperative relations. For, although welcome, 
the investment of the VW Group in Škoda—a company with such standing in the Czech 
Republic and so important for the national economy—still aroused reservations about 
selling the ‘jewel’ in the Czech industrial crown to a German group. The product 
development strategies adopted, which restored the Škoda brand to its former state and 
status favourably counteracted this sentiment. Equally if not more important than the 
first step in product improvement was the second, which envisaged greater product 
innovation, by which the Škoda brand was successfully upgraded internationally. It 
                                                 
24 Still today and almost more urgently than in the first years, Škoda demands greater political regulation of 
the second-hand vehicle market by the Czech government. In view of the danger of monopolist pricing by 
Škoda and the firm’s revived strength on the market, the initial market restrictions have been lifted, and so 
far no new restrictions have been imposed on the second-hand car market.  
25 In the marketing strategies for the product launch planned for autumn 1999, the company made it clear 
that this model had technically nothing to do with the earlier Škoda models Forman and Felicia. 
Particularly the older Škoda employees viewed this development with a mixture of pride in the brand 
name and wistful nostalgia. People were not sure whether or not the quality improvement had made a VW 
product out of the Škoda product and to what extent it could still be associated with the well-known 
Škoda competencies. 
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involved both expansion of the product range and entry into a higher-quality product 
segment. With the move into the mid-range car sector in 1996, the company abandoned 
the socialist monoculture with only one product in only one version. For the Škoda 
brand, production of the medium-sized model Octavia was an important advance in 
quality and image. The most striking evidence of newly won recognition and the new 
status of the brand is that the model achieved entry into the demanding and highly 
competitive Triad market Western Europe, and quickly won a relatively big market share. 
The development of exports gives a good indication of the dynamics. In 1998 78% of 
production was exported, 60% going to the EU. This was an increase of 37% over the 
previous year, and the biggest growth rate so far. Most exports went to East Germany, 
followed by the UK, Italy, Austria, and Sweden. At the same time the company was able 
to maintain its leading position in Eastern Europe and at home with a 55% share of the 
market. Meanwhile, however, Western Europe has overtaken the Czech Republic in both 
unit sales and growth rates.  
The answer to whether the product innovation strategy has strengthened Škoda 
competencies is twofold. While investment and cooperation were prerequisite for far-
reaching quality improvements, the higher quality needed for the mid-sized model 
overtaxed the company’s own resources. Only a major transfer of know-how from VW 
brought improvement on the scale and at the speed with which it was attained. This 
achievement was possible because innovation of the Škoda product coincided with a 
fundamental shift in the product development strategy of the group itself. The VW 
strategy, which had become known under the name of platform and identical parts 
policy, is closely associated with the name of CEO Piëch, who introduced major changes 
in products and production in reaction to the cost crisis of the early 90s and in 
anticipation of the growing competition that globalisation was expected to bring. The key 
to the new strategy was standardisation of the basic technical element, the chassis, also 
referred to as platform.26 By reducing the number of platforms from 16 to 4, the strategy 
proposed substantial economies of scale and drastic reductions in the high and growing 
costs of development. For the medium and lower range products of the group, and thus 
particularly for Škoda (not to mention Seat), this strategy brought considerable 
improvements in quality, since the yardstick taken for innovation was the highest 
technological level available within the VW Group. The smaller brands were therefore 
particularly upgraded. The improvement in both costs and quality envisioned by the VW 
Group’s platform strategy was also a response to an intensified product renewal strategy 
in the fiercely competitive Triad markets, characterised by a more and more rapid 
                                                 
26 The changes in production covered a whole range of measures including package and modular 
manufacture (cf the following section on the Škoda fractal factory) as well as joint production and, later, 
the multibrand strategy. This last strategy seeks to cover the whole range of the market with several group 
brands—an approach justified both by greater competition and by the associated need to be present in as 
many segments as possible.  
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succession of models—a development that would have affected Škoda products sooner 
rather than later. With this in mind, the platform strategy of standardisation and identical 
parts contributes much to enabling the profitable production of smaller numbers of units 
and thus to an economic advantage considered crucial in the high-volume business of the 
automotive industry.27  
The group naturally entrusted development of the new platforms not to the small and 
new manufacturing sites Škoda and Seat but to its old, established brand manufacturers 
Volkswagen and Audi, which also had the broad know-how on VW platforms. This 
concentration of development know-how necessarily obliged Škoda to relinquish 
responsibility for development in this area and to restrict its development competence to 
decentralised adaptation requirements. It was this gain in innovation and loss in 
competence that lent ambivalence to VW’s platform strategy.  
The goal of international competitiveness, central to the agreement and contingent on 
product innovation, conflicted with the similarly fundamental objective of permitting 
Škoda to retain the most important core competencies of a motor vehicle manufacturer. 
At the outset of the project the divergence between these goals had not been anticipated, 
since it arose only with the new group strategy. That the centralisation strategy was 
nevertheless accepted without much objection is attributable firstly to the significant 
market progress the company would make with VW-based product innovation, and 
secondly to maintenance of the Škoda development division in size and importance 
despite the assignment of platform development to VW and Audi.28 The reason was 
higher and steadily increasing standards in product improvement and general quality, and 
in more recent design requirements. Greater attention to design had been necessitated by 
the stronger differentiation of brands now needed for marketing purposes in view of the 
largely identical technological basis of the products. Although the new development tasks 
provided a large degree of compensation, the Czechs felt they could be no substitute for 
competence in the technologically demanding core area of chassis production, and that 
responsibility for this core product should be brought back to Škoda.29  
Czech insistence on the contractual commitment to maintain the company as a fully 
functioning brand manufacturer shows how closely the competence question ties in with 
regional and industry cultural identity. It had been well understood that if Škoda joined 
the VW Group there would be restrictions on the independence of the company. And in 
                                                 
27 In 1997 a quarter of group models had been converted to the new platform, and in 1998 the figure was 
already 50%.  
28 R&D had been relatively big from the very outset of the joint venture with VW because supplier 
development was also concentrated at Škoda. Despite the new division of labour this division now has a 
staff of over 1000. 
29 Plans to redistribute the four platforms at a later date to all four group brands Volkswagen, Audi, Seat, 
and Škoda had once before been discussed. What this actually means and how extensive the respective 
responsibilities would be is an open question. So far Volkswagen and Audi are exclusively responsible for 
all strategic functional and safety components. 
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the knowledge that the upgrade in brand and image could not have been achieved alone, 
and that the shift in strategy at the product level had brought a further, significant 
improvement, the loss of competence ultimately proved not very controversial. 
Another restriction was seen much more critically than the platform strategy, one that 
arose from the division of labour in the group. The issue was responsibility for new 
engine production at Škoda, which had also been promised under the cooperation 
agreement. Given the underused capacities in the West, the planned factory was not built 
and production at the Czech site was not launched. In view of the cooperation 
agreement, the compromise negotiated between the Škoda management and the group at 
least gave the Czech site a share in production. Even if Škoda was assigned only the 
simpler task of engine assembly and the German high-cost site was entrusted with the 
capital-intensive manufacturing, at least Škoda involvement in the new development had 
been secured. And in order to limit negative impact on regional suppliers, a compromise 
was agreed to the effect that Czech and Slovak companies would be among the suppliers 
of components to the German manufacturing site. This arrangement was designed to 
prevent a group division of labour gaining ground in which Škoda and the local supply 
industry would be cut off from modernisation developments. As with the platform 
strategy, the background was the effort to bring the development and manufacture of the 
new generation of engines for future Škoda products to the established site.  
This phase has meanwhile been reached by Škoda owing to the expansion of capacities 
and internal demand. This interim solution has now proved to be an important bridge, 
and, with a new engine factory again on the agenda, Škoda is in an extremely good 
position. Not only would the project brings competencies back to Škoda but, in the 
context of joint production—a third of production is for Western export to 
Volkswagen—it would also imply higher status and broader network-related standards. 
Although current economic and technical conditions at Škoda are much better than in 
the reorganisation phase, it was far from self-evident that the firm would be successful in 
winning the engine production project against competition within the VW Group. In 
spite of the basic agreement on the issue, the group brought this new competitive 
element strongly into play, and now made the award to Škoda additionally conditional on 
subsidisation. Given the company’s strong position in the Czech economy, this was 
granted in very large measure by the government.30 The investor was thus able to push 
through a considerable supplementary demand in return for restoring competencies. It is 
striking that the Czech government held out the prospect of selling its remaining stake in 
Škoda to VW if the project were to be realised. Although these events show the 
enhanced position of power enjoyed by the company, they also reveal a change in the 
attitude of the Czech government, which now adopted an incentive policy in pursuit of 
                                                 
30 The final decision on the project has still to be made, since subsidisation amounting to a quarter of total 
costs triggered intervention by the EU competition authorities.  
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industrial objectives. This is evidenced not only by the ease with which the subsidy was 
granted but also by the government’s recent public musings about abandoning its 
ownership role.31  
 
2. Production Modernisation and Transfer Management 
The parallel strategies of product improvement and innovation finds their counterparts 
in production modernisation. While gradual restructuring was pursued at the old parent 
works in accordance with the principles of decentralised, flexible production, the aim 
with the new product was to introduce a fundamentally new production system in the 
form of a new greenfield factory. The dual procedure was to serve the differing needs of 
two markets, East and West. As far as the existing production system was concerned, the 
structures, although backward and deficient, were still of a relatively good technological 
standard. In the context of local industry Škoda’s pre-eminent position was particularly 
apparent, evidenced by a previous modernisation phase in the mid-80s.32 Even if 
considerable changes were clearly necessary over and above the transition from plan to 
market, there was nonetheless a basically intact and functioning production structure.33 
Although the old Škoda system naturally could not match the more flexible structures 
meanwhile necessary in the West, and reorganisation in accordance with the new criteria 
was needed, radical action was not absolutely necessary because the established Eastern 
market was still much less demanding with respect to quality, customer orientation, and 
reliability. A gradual transition was thus perfectly feasible. As with product quality, 
however, it was to be expected that the anticipated Western competition on the market 
would soon raise expectations with regard to organisation, too. Mere optimisation would 
not suffice. More fundamental structural innovation would be needed.  
The decision not to restrict ambitions to the Eastern European market but to establish 
the Škoda product on the much more demanding Western markets presented the 
production system with particularly far-reaching challenges. It is therefore no surprise 
that, with its sights set on international competitiveness, Škoda aspired to higher 
standards not only in product quality but also in organisation. The importance placed on 
the service function in the Western market was the main inducement for adopting a 
                                                 
31 Under the heading company news on 8 August 1999 the NZZ reported on the subject of “Further 
Privatisation at Škoda” that, in view of the good experience with the parent company and the economic 
progress achieved, it was intended to transfer the remaining stake to Volkswagen.  
32 Such developments are to be seen in the context of the Gorbachev era, which brought greater 
liberalisation and transparency for enterprise modernisation, too. At Škoda this affected particularly 
business contacts with Western firms and the procurement of modern technology (Schomer/Herkenhoff 
1994) 
33 At the very beginning, the Western transfer management saw this in a different light, resulting in 
dysfunctional changes owing to an ad hoc approach not based on any extensive period of planning and 
without exact knowledge of the actual state of affairs (Dörr/Kessel 1997). 
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production concept that satisfied these requirements. The importance of the step 
required a high proportion of investment to be earmarked for this innovation.  
The new factory at Škoda represents two new departures in the restructuring of the firm: 
first, a consistent, location-related design for the production system, and, second, 
alignment with the international state of motor vehicle production in the sense of far-
reaching modernisation. The new works at the Czech site surpassed existing VW 
standards, following a model that was very advanced from a Western point of view. It 
combined the specific locational low-cost/high-skill structures with the more recent 
principles of modular production.  
In organisational design, the much discussed ‘fractal factory’ model has been consistently 
implemented. The modular principle is applied not only in manufacturing in the 
narrower sense but also in development of the new product. The better coordinated and 
more closely related functions of development, production, and organisation permit 
greater processual coherence. With regard to work organisation, the new production 
system displays elements meanwhile common in the industry, including decentralisation, 
flatter hierarchies, group and team work structures, and more strongly communication-
based coordination. At Škoda the greater flexibility typical of modular manufacturing—
associated with new possibilities of insourcing and outsourcing, which allow more 
complex subsystems to be entrusted to subcontractors—is linked with close integration 
of such so-called system suppliers. The characteristic feature of the Škoda fractal 
production concept is precisely the extent of supplier integration. System suppliers were 
located not only in the immediate vicinity of the manufacturing plant and in surrounding 
industrial estates—as has traditionally been the case in Western locations in keeping with 
the just-in-time system—but directly in the plant, and directly integrated into the 
production process. 
The prerequisite for the viability of such a far-reaching model, which basically dissolves 
traditional dividing lines between plants and gives rise to diversified working relations, 
was a high degree of uniformity in pay and working conditions. This was due to a regional 
characteristic rooted in both local industry culture and union policy. In contrast to 
Germany, there are no notable pay differentials between manufacturers and suppliers, 
elsewhere a factor in social conflict. Moreover, trade union policy was strongly guided by 
a principle of equality opposed to any major differentials between employees and to 
more than one union in a company. Sole representation of worker interests by the 
company group of the Czech metal workers union KOVO obviated another source of 
tension. A third factor was equalisation of the social standards of manufacturer and the 
integrated suppliers. Concessions were achieved upon introduction of the model, for 
example the use of the company infrastructure and retention of entitlements upon 
transfer to a supplier. Thus a high measure of homogeneity could be attained also in 
corporate culture standards, counteracting the model’s potential for ‘social fractalisation.’  
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The level of automation was also much lower than in the West. In this regard the production 
system reflects the generally lower pay levels in the Czech Republic and the region.34 As 
we have seen, however, this factor gained its current importance only with the cost crisis 
in the VW Group. The Spanish subsidiary Seat, the reference model for Škoda, had still 
been provided with a technology-intensive production system. Emphasis on labour 
rather than technology was one of the central elements in the cost-cutting strategy 
pursued at Škoda. The impact of this reorientation went beyond the company, for it was 
the first disavowal of the rationalisation and modernisation course typical of VW.35 This 
rethinking is to be seen not least of all in the context of the lean-production debate that 
arose in the 80s, which focused on the strong technology orientation in the automotive 
industry as a key problem of the German production model. Under changed global 
competitive conditions, with higher cost and flexibility requirements, the competitiveness 
of the ‘over-mechanised’ VW path had long been considered limited.  
Measured against the economic and labour resources of the production system, what 
initially seemed a limitation has proved a new enablement. For the lower level of 
automation not only averted high capital costs to the advantage of the company; the 
concept offered another opportunity with respect to labour policy. The firm 
commitment to both technically demanding skilled jobs and to simple jobs was due not 
only to a more flexible deployment strategy. The provision of jobs across this spectrum 
also had the important labour market effect of safeguarding employment both for the—
in principle—strong group of skilled and highly skilled employees and for the low-skilled 
and unskilled.  
Another aspect of this production concept is its implications for the safeguarding of the 
company’s competence as a manufacturer. For the specific combination of factors 
offered by Škoda—low labour costs plus low capital costs—there was no need from the 
cost point of view to pursue the lean production principle as intensively as in the West. 
This was apparent from Škoda’s greater vertical range of manufacture.  
It can be assumed that the reduction of automation levels in the Škoda production 
concept sent a signal to other VW Group investment projects in the region. A lower 
degree of mechanisation was also envisaged in the later production concept adopted by 
                                                 
34 In the earlier transition years, wage levels were lower in the Czech Republic than in Hungary and 
Poland. In comparison to Germany the pay differential was 1 to 10. Although wages in the Czech 
Republic have risen considerably in recent years, this differential has still not changed much. Moreover, 
pay rises at Škoda are accompanied by substantial rises in productivity, so that higher wage costs can be 
more than offset. The growth in productivity has been 12% annually, and last year it reached 17.4% 
(Škoda director of production Büsching in AutomobilProduktion 4/1999, 28, Škoda annual report 1998). 
35 This is not the place to judge the extent to which the capital-intensive VW model is attributable to the 
philosophy of Hahn’s predecessor or whether it can be regarded as a general element of German 
engineering culture that was put to the test only with the intensification of cost competition in the field of 
development. In speeches assessing Czech industrial enterprises shortly after 1990, Hahn identified not 
only high manning levels but also inadequate technology as a key deficiency, and called for substantial 
technology transfer to Škoda (cf. Keller 1993). 
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the VW subsidiary Audi at Györ in Hungary, where there was also a specific combination 
of very capital-intensive and very labour-intensive functional areas. And the site in 
Slovakia is particularly typical in this regard. One of the VW Group’s bigger investment 
projects, it had the lowest mechanisation level, not exceeding 35% even in the more 
highly automatized areas.36  
It remains an open question whether the mixture of capital-intensive and labour-
intensive functional areas at the Eastern manufacturing sites reflects the regional 
structure of low labour costs and skilled labour, and can thus be considered specific to 
the region, or whether it is a more general structural element of the new production 
system prompted by the new competition in quality, market share, and costs. However, 
there is evidence that intensified competition favours such a constellation. If this is the 
case, the Eastern Central European region with its typical low-cost and high-skill 
conditions may well have a production model more competitive than that of the West.  
The establishment of a new production system with such far-reaching consequences 
would have been unthinkable without the transfer of skilled labour and management for 
restructuring purposes. The services of a large contingent of expatriates were made 
available to implement the high standards of quality set by the group. Almost 300 skilled 
workers and managerial employees, who were deployed at Škoda for a limited period, 
had the task of optimising all core areas of the company as quickly and comprehensively 
as possible, and setting up the competence areas such as marketing, sales, and controlling 
which had been lacking for systemic reasons. Whereas Western managers were strongly 
pre-dominant in these areas, this was not equally the case in production and 
development, which were the strengths of the company, and where further training was 
concerned ‘only’ with bringing competence up to scratch.  
Since such a constellation—the reorganisation of an old-established company, a change 
in system, global competition, and a high-power modernisation concept—was 
unprecedented, and since the investment project involved was extremely large, the 
transfer procedure applied was unusual and elaborate. So-called tandems, double 
appointments to leading positions, were intended to facilitate knowledge transfer and 
restructuring during running production. The transfer procedure thus reflects the basic 
strategy elements of resource preservation and innovation. However, the tandem 
structure with formal equality of status internally and with no division of labour and 
responsibilities did not prove a simple instrument. For a system aiming to permit the 
greatest possible exchange of experience and knowledge in a narrow process of (every-
                                                 
36 This is particularly evident when comparing Bratislava with the other group sites also responsible for 
Golf production. Traditionally, automation is most advanced at the parent plant in Wolfsburg. The works 
in Brussels and Mosel in East Germany are approximately at the same level in the areas of pressing, prime 
construction and paint work (85 to 90%), but are at only about 30% of the Wolfsburg level in assembly. 
Bratislava does not exceed the 35% mark in any area (Weißgerber, Markenvorstand VW in 
AutomobilProduktion 10/97, 56). 
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day) collaboration was confronted by the classical leadership notions and clearly 
circumscribed areas of competence usual in industrial enterprises—on both sides. 
Moreover, the structure of power was often very inequitable, despite formal equality, 
firstly because of the knowledge asymmetry between actors and secondly because of the 
arrangements for appraisal of the Czech tandem partner’s performance. These structural 
conditions were joined by another circumstance. A not inconsiderable number of the 
Western transfer personnel knew little about the region, and some of the actors still had 
little professional experience. This provoked defensive reactions and conflicts not only in 
the immediate work process but also attracted a considerable amount of attention in the 
company—albeit in limited, isolated cases. Preconceptions about German arrogance 
were activated, and such cases were seen as evidence of a lack of recognition by the 
cooperation partner, who—it was claimed—had in part sent Škoda ‘third-class 
management.’ This tense situation among personnel was greatly exacerbated by the group 
crisis and investment cuts.  
Consequently, the partly objective partly emotional conflict structure had a substantial 
impact on the transfer process and on cooperation. However, it also generated a 
challenge. For the high value that local actors placed on the Škoda tradition and sound 
basic competence in car making counteracted a one-way notion of transfer and 
cooperation and obliged Western actors to proceed with greater sensitivity. This 
countervailing factor, which demanded more discussion and persuasion, successfully 
opposed the sometimes overt, sometimes implicit arrogance of Western transfer 
management. Furthermore, it contributed not inconsiderably to the restructuring being 
understood as an undertaking that, in the combination of local resources and transfer 
knowledge, demanded solutions other than the tried and tested ones envisaged. Although 
the situation thus demanded a great deal of the Western actors, it offered them a much 
appreciated possibility to use the relatively broad scope for action available for personal 
initiative. For in comparison with structures at Volkswagen, Škoda—with its 20,000 
employees much smaller than Wolfsburg—and the ongoing restructuring process at the 
Czech location offered broad scope for change and for trying out new ideas.  
The new factory was particularly promising in this respect. However, the greenfield 
strategy of constructing a completely new plant, reputedly easier to realise than structural 
reorganisation, turned out to be not without problems. Recruitment was the main one. In 
order to make as few concessions to the old Škoda culture as possible and to avoid 
transferring it to the new structure, internal applicants were excluded. People were 
recruited only from outside the firm, and a costly training programme for this group was 
put in place. That the wide-spread managerial notion of ‘handpicked personnel’ is not of 
itself the better solution became clear when most of the new workforce left after a brief 
period. The Czech labour market was very limited because of the long delay in 
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restructuring local industry,37 and there was a very high demand in local firms for such 
people with higher qualifications. This experience provoking rethinking about the 
generally negative appraisal of the corporate culture, and aspects like length of service 
and loyalty, identification with occupation and work were reassessed.  
There was a conflict and learning situation requiring similar rethinking among the 
workforce. The cause was the new form of production system. Since some of the 
structural elements recalled the old socialist system, there was initially a great deal of 
scepticism towards the innovations. There was the strong emphasis on the production 
level owing to decentralisation, the importance of networked, informal hierarchical 
structures as opposed to clear, normal hierarchies; and there was the particular stress 
placed on team and group work, which smacked of brigades and work collectives, or the 
so-called CIP activities, which could be interpreted as a variant of socialist competition. 
The irritations and reservations that these structural similarities caused were so great 
because they were not in tune with the ideas of efficient and rational production 
organisation—ideas that had developed among the relevant groups like skilled workers 
and engineers in taking their distance from the deficient structures hitherto experienced. 
What is more, quite different expectations with respect to organisation were levelled at 
the German partner, in particular, with regard to efficiency and the suitability of 
structures. With the upturn in the fortunes of the company and growing confidence in 
handling the structures, the production system is now seen in a different light and the 
initial reservations have proved unjustified.  
 
3. The Supply Industry and Integration 
With the dual strategy of preserving and ameliorating the current product lin3e and of 
product innovation, the VW-Škoda project impacted not only the company itself but also 
the local supply industry. The established supplier network was basically retained and 
integrated into the reorganised structures of the manufacturer. A gradual transition 
process was therefore able to take effect here, too, which preserved a high measure of 
structural resources. 
Naturally, the motive for Škoda’s commitment in this field was ultimately economic, to 
exploit the cost advantages in the region not only in the narrower sense of in-house 
production but also through maximal local sourcing. This explains why the supplier issue 
was never a point of fundamental controversy between the group and the Czech 
government in the history of the Škoda-VW project, because the interests of both sides 
were highly congruent and local sourcing was an obvious solution precisely under the 
dictates of the group-wide cost-cutting strategy. Avoiding a high proportion of imported 
                                                 
37 In the first transition years, the Czech unemployment rate was between 3% and 4%, about three to four 
times lower than in the neighbouring countries Hungary and Poland. In the area around Mladá Boleslav, 
where Škoda is located, the figure was 1%.  
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components must also be seen in the market and price policy context. Since Škoda 
operates in a much lower price segment than the two established group brands 
Volkswagen and Audi, the costs for the comparatively expensive imported supplies can 
be passed on to the market only to a very limited extent. 
Škoda gave high priority to further training for local suppliers. Here, too, there was a 
personal aspect in play. For during the early years of the joint venture, the firm had been 
headed by two people regarded as authorities on Eastern European industrial structures, 
and who did much to promote the development of the regional supply industry. The 
first, on the Czech side, was a representative of the local supply industry in the person of 
the chief executive officer, and the second, on the German side, his deputy, the long-
standing representative of the group for business relations with Eastern Europe. This, 
too, gave high strategic salience to the supplier problem at Škoda.  
The most important upgrading strategy was cooperation with Western firms. Over and 
above this, know-how was transferred through an internal training programme for 
suppliers. The purpose was to allow local companies, too, to restructure to meet the new 
demands in quality and flexibility as quickly as possible. VW’s investment in Škoda thus 
had an important spillover effect on the local supplier industry. Until the end of 1997, 
almost one fifth of all foreign direct investment in the Czech Republic flowed into the 
automotive and supplier industry (CzechInvest 1998, 5). In contrast to Hungary, which 
had no comparable sectoral structures, and where greenfield projects predominated, the 
Czech Republic had a high proportion of joint ventures and takeovers. Some 80 joint 
ventures with local firms have so far followed the VW example. In addition, 50 new 
Western companies have been set up.  
Another, more political motive for actively promoting local suppliers was the stagnation 
in corporate restructuring the Czech approach to transformation had caused (see below). 
Given the delay in corporate transformation in broad sections of local industry, the 
company management made a determined effort to forestall any crisis by creating a 
competitive and stable network of suppliers transferring know-how and supporting East-
West joint ventures.  
Product innovation under the platform strategy and the new, modular production 
concept brought major changes with a substantial impact on relations with suppliers. 
Centralising responsibility for the chassis platform meant that Škoda is far more strongly 
committed to the group network for supplies. This opened a cleavage between the group 
and the production site. From the cost point of view alone, integration in VW’s platform 
and identical parts policy was far less beneficial to Škoda than to the German brands, 
because in principle it diminished the advantage to be derived from maximum locally 
added value. What from the group perspective generated substantial savings through 
standardisation and higher economies of scale, and which furthermore countered the 
problem of overcapacities in German plants through the concentration of 
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responsibilities, meant much high expenditure on Western imports for Škoda. The 
difference between the total cost perspective of the group and the standpoint of the 
individual firm reflects one of the more general conflict structures of such transnational 
corporate networks, and reveals the divergence between the interests of the 
superordinate group and those of the regional production site.  
The impact of the platform strategy is particularly striking in the changed sourcing ratio. 
Although the strong expansion of capacities at Škoda’s, which doubled production, also 
more than doubled local purchasing, the ratio of local to global content shifted in favour 
of foreign imports. In 1996, 80% of procurement was local, but by 1998 the figure was 
only 70%. With the successor model in the small car series, also to be based on a VW 
platform, local sourcing will decline further. The share of imported Western components 
is likely to rise to 40%, the level already reached for the current mid-range model.  
These consequences of the new production concept primarily affect the structure of 
supplier relations. For product and process innovation in the form of modular 
manufacture has induced a general structural change in the sector (Dörr/Kessel 1999a). 
The modular principle made it possible to split production into larger units, which can be 
completed relatively independently of one another. This also made it possible to 
outsource more comprehensive production tasks, or to assign them to suppliers. Overall, 
this meant changes in the division of labour between manufacturer and suppliers. 
Transferring complex tasks involving a greater development competencies to the supplier 
industry has brought stronger concentration and fostered group structures.  
The manufacturer’s more demanding requirements in the provision of complex systems 
set a mark too high for the Czech supplier industry to reach unaided. It was thus not 
surprising that locally established Western suppliers assumed the key role of so-called 
system suppliers for Škoda. For the internal differentiation of local content, this means a 
clear concentration on this similarly internationalised area, which, at least as far as system 
suppliers are concerned, can be assumed to generate a substantial proportion of value 
added through the group network. Expressed in figures, one fourth of Škoda purchases 
are from the eight system suppliers directly integrated into the company. 60% are from 
80 locally established international suppliers. A total of 680 Škoda suppliers is reported 
(AutomobilProduktion 4/1999, 30). 
There is a factor that could counteract the limitation of locally added value implied by the 
platform strategy and the development of system suppliers. It is the principle of global 
sourcing endorsed by the group’s cost cutting strategy, which aims to broaden a cost-
effective supplier basis. This could present (local-international) supplier firms in the 
Czech Republic with far-reaching options. And the further training Škoda organises for 
the local supplier industry is to be seen not least of all in this context, namely as an 
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endeavour to open up the region for supplies to the group over and above Škoda itself.38 
For the Czech supplier industry, links with the group network could thus in some 
measure compensate the decline in local content at Škoda.  
Taking stock of developments with regard to the supplier industry, Škoda has thus 
retained a relatively high level of regional integration, or has re-established it in modified 
form, despite the restrictions imposed by the platform strategy. Restructuring through 
internationalisation (Dörr/Kessel 1999a) has thus permitted component makers to build 
a high level of capacity through know-how transfer to meet international competition in 
quality, flexibility, and costs. The automotive industry is among the most important 
growth industries in the Czech Republic today. Some 3% of all jobs are in this sector,39 
and it produces 11% of the country’s entire industrial output. The importance of the 
industry for the national economy is also indicated by export data. As the company with 
the highest turnover in 1998 (DM 5.6 billion), Škoda alone had a 9.2% share in the 
country’s total exports. Suppliers add a further 5% (Severoceské Noviny 8 June 1999).  
Seen in the overall context of Czech industry, the importance of developments at Škoda 
and in the supplier industry for the Czech economy is particularly apparent. 
Macroeconomic data indicate a persistent downward trend in growth rates for industrial 
production and labour productivity (WIIW 1999, 7). Production growth also differs 
greatly between the strongly internationalised motor vehicle manufactucturing and 
components industry and local industry. On the basis of 1991 figures, Škoda reached a 
score of 224 and the rest of Czech industry only 74 (NZZ 15 March 1999). It is clear that 
the enormously high rate of growth in the automotive and supply industries has had an 
important positive impact on the macroeconomic position, but an extremely dangerous 
gap has developed between the international company sector and domestic industry, 
dangerous also because the economically powerful big firms in the international sector 
have a strong external orientation, being integrated into transnational supplier and 
production networks. While this new cross-border exchange structure gives companies 
like Škoda a highly developed propensity for cooperation, there is a marked trend in 
favour of international partners, whether locally established or within the VW Group. 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 The importance that purchasing has gained is also indicated by the establishment at group headquarters 
of a Corporate Sourcing Committee, which decides on the selection of suppliers. Worldwide purchasing is 
divided into four major regions, each in the charge of one of the high-volume brands of the group. Under 
Škoda’s responsibility for Eastern Europe, 80 firms have so far been won as suppliers to the group, and 
efforts are being made to increase this number.  
39 The total population of the Czech Republic is 10.3 million, with a labour force of 5.3 million 
(CzechInvest 1999a). With its 23,000 employees, Škoda is one of the biggest employers.  
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IV. The Political Level: Government and Local Industry 
Recalling our initial thesis of the relevance of the transformation regime for industrial 
competence development, we take a perspective on the role of government that again 
goes beyond the Škoda case. For Czech industry as a whole presents a far less positive 
picture than the Škoda complex. In short, the Czech Republic has adopted a two-track 
approach to restructuring, involving both defensive stagnation and strategic innovation, 
with the dividing line running between local and internationalised industry.  
Although the policy for the traditional second pillar of Czech industry, mechanical 
engineering, had also been to safeguard existing competencies, in contrast to the 
automotive industry it was decided to adopt a national restructuring approach that 
basically excluded foreign investment. Like the motor vehicle construction and supply 
industries, mechanical engineering is dominated by a limited number of key firms, the 
conglomerate Škoda Pilsen and CKD Praha. Here, too, foreign investors were in the 
offing, but no prospect of a far-reaching sales and restructuring strategy was proffered as 
when Škoda Auto was privatised. To avoid lucrative business segments being sold to 
foreign investors, which would also have meant hiving off and losing upstream and 
downstream competence areas, a ‘national solution’ was adopted to preserve the 
companies in the sector as far as possible. This doubtless counteracted break-up and 
deindustrialization processes such as took place in East Germany, but developments 
showed that adequate modernisation was impossible without support, and that the 
strategic objective of structural preservation operated to the detriment of international 
competitiveness. Mechanical engineering is consequently under growing pressure to 
restructure, and it is highly questionable whether the ambitious goal of comprehensively 
preserving regional competence can be upheld.  
The case of the mechanical engineering group Škoda Pilsen is interesting not only from 
the restructuring point of view. It is also a Czech attempt to support a sector in the 
hands of local owners. Approval for the management’s strategy of expansion by 
acquiring and integrating other major companies (including the heavy goods vehicle 
makers Liaz and Tatra) can be interpreted as signalling ‘national global player’ 
ambitions.40 The dominance of big companies and conglomerate structures—which had 
in part increased still further during transformation—together with the failure to develop 
the small and medium-sized sector, can be regarded as specific to the Czech path to 
transformation. 
The Czech case is particularly instructive, because the country had long been considered 
a model for successful transformation, and the economic policy of the non-socialist 
                                                 
40 Škoda mechanical engineering is not an exception. Similar strategies have been adopted by the chemical 
industry, for example, especially the Chemapol group, which not only wanted to underpin its leading 
position in the industry through acquisitions but also sought intensive diversification through participation 
in manufacturing firms (NZZ 23 December 1997, Handelsblatt 6 October 1998).  
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conservative government under prime minister Vaclav Klaus enjoyed high international 
regard. Although company studies had drawn attention at an early date to the failure of 
broad sections of local industry to restructure (Clark/Soulsby 1995, Carlin et al 1995 and 
on the course of restructuring at Škoda mechanical engineering, especially 
Hayri/McDermott 1995, Tänzler/Mazálková 1996), this problem was not recognised for 
a long time by macroeconomic structural analyses (e.g., Kosta 1997).41 It was only with 
the critical downturn two years ago that prevailing transformation policy was revised and 
a political turnaround took place in the Czech Republic. 
In the Czech approach to transformation, three key policy choices were largely 
instrumental in provoking the serious setback at such a relatively late stage: the 
privatisation model, the one-sided concentration on macroeconomic stability goals, and, 
finally, restricted access for foreign capital and a defensive direct investment policy. 
 
a)  Privatisation Model  
The Czech Republic had more rapid success than other transition countries in 
privatisation, one of the basic regulatory requirements in transforming the economic 
system.42 A key element was so-called voucher privatisation, allowing the public to 
acquire share options in productive property (for details on Czech privatisation see 
Mertlik 1996 and Windolf 1999). This permitted the rapid conversion of state property 
into private property but produced ownership configurations doubly disadvantageous for 
corporate restructuring. First, the small-shareholder structure prevented the inflow of 
investment capital and know-how needed for modernisation,43 and no effective 
corporate governance structures developed capable of contriving deglomeration and 
strategic re-orientation.  
The frequent governance problem is mainly the result of the high level of debt between 
companies and vis-à-vis the banks, and of soft budget constraints, which allow inefficient 
and unprofitable firms to survive. The close links between firms and the financial system 
have been identified as a serious weak point in Czech transformation (WIIW 1999, 
Pöschl 1998). While the (non-privatised) banks often play the double role of 
creditor/lender and owner representative, the crises of major debtor firms jeopardise 
bank liquidity. Under these conditions, further loans are granted to major loss-making 
                                                 
41 There was a whole range of reasons. Among the main ones was doubtless that domestic industry had 
initially been able to hold its own in its traditional Eastern markets. However, the discontinuation of 
exports to Russia could not be compensated by a greater share in the demanding international markets in 
the West. Despite currency-related price advantages, Czech competitiveness in up-market segments was 
limited. 
42 As early as 1996 some 80% of industry had been privatised (Kosta 1997, 8). This figure is high not only 
in comparison with Poland and Hungary but also considering that much more of the Czech economy had 
been state owned than in the neighbouring countries. (Heidenreich 1994). 
43 See Windolf 1994 for a seminal treatment of the problem of small shareholders in supervisory bodies 
and the interest in short-term profits versus strategic investors’ long-term profit orientation.  
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companies, and—owing to the far-reaching social and industrial consequences—
bankruptcy law is often not applied in the case of such major firms. All in all, the 
privatisation model and the lack of effective governance institutions have produced a 
sort of tripartism in Czech industry between firms, banks, and government, which 
strongly upholds structural persistence, and which has provided only insufficient 
conditions and/or incentives for corporate restructuring. 
 
b)  Macroeconomic Stability Goals 
For two reasons the Czech Republic has pursued a policy far more closely guided by 
considerations of macroeconomic balance than in other transition countries. First, the 
point of departure was much more favourable than in neighbouring Poland and 
Hungary: the budget, for example, was balanced and foreign debt was low, making such a 
course appear more viable. Second, the government had adopted the neo-liberal position 
of intervening as little as possible in the economy, largely eschewing any active industrial 
policy. The background was a grave misjudgement of the situation, not only with regard 
to the process policy controls needed despite good ‘initial equipment’, but especially with 
respect to continuity of action by the players involved. In short, the main problem of 
Czech economic policy was that structures and control instruments tried and tested in 
Western market economy contexts were deployed without taking account of the 
transformation situation, without taking sufficiently into consideration that the prevailing 
structures and conditions for action differed from those in an established market 
economy. The key economic agents thus assumed that the introduction of market and 
competitive principles would more or less automatically reorient action towards the 
pursuit of economic rationality. 
A look at industry reveals the consequences for the government’s anti-inflation policy of 
such a foreshortened institutional understanding of transformation. For although strict 
control of the money supply succeeded in keeping inflation down, the high interest rates 
made it more difficult, especially for small and medium-sized firms, to obtain the loans 
necessary for investment. Just as fatefully, the big companies, already deeply in debt, 
reacted not with greater financial discipline but by borrowing still more (Pöschl 1998). 
Precisely the conditions outlined, with banks and industry closely interlocked, allowed big 
firms to espouse such survival strategies. For consistently market-oriented behaviour, 
both the institutional setting and the prerequisite action orientations among lending 
banks and borrowing companies were lacking.  
It is therefore a general problem that economic agents failed to behave as expected; in 
other words, that economic policy presupposing a functioning market economy and 
control mechanisms ignored the institutional contextualization. There was also a lack of 
backup measures to establish a link or a balance between macroeconomic stability goals 
and company-level restructuring requirements. Old structures were thus further 
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consolidated and the national economy has had to shoulder a very heavy burden of 
(government) support for highly indebted big companies.  
 
c)  Limited Access for Foreign Investment 
With its only recently abandoned defensive direct investment policy, the Czech Republic 
differed fundamentally from other transition countries. Whereas Poland and especially 
Hungary made attracting foreign direct investment a priority policy goal, there was no 
specific incentive programme for foreign investors in the Czech Republic. Apart fro a 
few large-scale projects like the privatisation of Škoda Auto or in the telecommunications 
industry , for which special conditions were negotiated, the Czech government took a 
restrictive attitude. That the inflow of foreign capital, although not official restricted, was 
not actively supported points to two further aspects of the Czech path to transformation. 
First, the need to deglomerate and modernise was underestimated because the industrial 
preconditions had been better than in neighbouring countries. Second, strong emphasis 
was placed on independence, which the sale of key industrial enterprises to Western 
investors and the influence they would consequently acquire was considered to 
jeopardise. This last attitude can be seen as a reaction to historical experience with the 
Soviet regime, which—as in other transition countries—reinforced national 
identification, and made national sovereignty an important political topos.  
Although both viewpoints can be understood in the historical context, they are not 
unproblematic in the changed international environment confronting the transition 
countries. Not only had direct investment become much more important for national 
economies under the conditions of globalisation, but the decision to apply for EU 
membership set a course that placed national sovereignty on a new basis. Accelerated 
economic internationalisation and political transnationalisation now face the transition 
countries, processes to which the West had been able to adjust gradually, but which the 
transition countries now have to cope with overnight, as it were.  
Finally, we turn in brief to the shift in policy provoked by the economic crisis in the 
Czech Republic.44 One of the most marked changes has been the abandonment of the 
national transformation path hitherto pursued. Since 1998, legislation has been in force 
that provides for tax relief and state aid for large-scale investments,45 which—according 
                                                 
44 The turnaround had already been initiated under the Klaus government. Confronted by steadily 
worsening economic performance figures and a financial scandal, the government resigned in late 1997. 
Until the early elections in mid-1998, a transitional government under the head of the national bank, 
Tosovsky, took over.  
45 Investment incentives are granted for projects worth at least $ 10 million. The incentive package 
includes the following measures: five year relief for corporation tax, subsidies for new jobs and for initial 
and further training, infrastructure, duty-free imports of machinery and equipment, production in free 
zones (CzechInvest 1999b). The incentive package adopted in December 1998 is an amended version of 
the April 1998 arrangements. The main changes are a reduced minimum investment (from $ 25 million to 
$ 10 million) and higher support per new job, from $ 2,500 to $ 3,300. 
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to not uncontroversial official statistics—has led to a significant rise in foreign direct 
investment.46 Despite this positive signal, the Czech economy continues to suffer from 
serious restructuring deficits in local industry. The structural policy omissions of the early 
years are likely to have had a particularly deleterious impact. For not only are 
neighbouring countries now well ahead of the Czech Republic in building up a 
functioning market-economy institutional system, especially in banking, but opaque 
corporate governance structures and rising corporate debt offer little incentive for 
prospective entrepreneurial investment and Western cooperation projects.  
Another important factor in this context is the political enforceability of so drastic a 
reform programme—envisaging the deconcentration and consistent market orientation 
of major enterprises—not only with regard to strategic actors in management but also in 
view of the social consequences.47 Another curb on political action in the Czech 
Republic is the lack of a reliable majority for the minority Social Democrat government 
that has been in office for the past year. The stalemate emerging from the elections 
imposed a tolerance pact with the largest opposition party headed by former prime 
minister Klaus. This arrangement, designed to retain power for the governing party and 
safeguard the influence of the opposition, has strongly restricted the new government’s 
scope for action, since it has to woo support in the opposition camp for every item of 
legislation, resulting in political stability at the price of stagnation. Nonetheless, there are 
signs with regard to local industry that, with the prioritised reform of the banking 
industry, stricter conditions for lending and in enterprise control are now taking effect, 
imposing more fundamental reorganisation on the major conglomerates.48  
This is also the case with industrial policy, which in the first years of the Klaus 
government had not been purposively and actively pursued. This course was abandoned 
only when the crisis could no longer be ignored and external pressure on the government 
increased appreciably. From this point of view, the Czech Republic can be said to have 
followed a strongly traditional-national path to transformation, despite the formal 
opening up of the economy and the Western orientation of policy. The change in policy 
was the outcome of forced ‘learning’ from the crisis and from external criticism, 
articulated chiefly by the supranational organisations EU and OECD, which have 
                                                 
46 The amount of $ 2.5 billion is recorded for 1998 as compared with $ 1.4 billion in 1996 and $ 1.3 billion 
in 1997 (CzechInvest 1999a, 2). The total is given as $ 11 billion. The Czech Republic is thus still behind 
Hungary as a country comparable in size, but the gap appears to be gradually closing.  
47 See also the criticism of President Havel, who pointed to the difficulty of winning the population at this 
late stage in the transformation process for drastic social privations and sacrifices that would have much 
been much more willingly accepted in the initial stages of transformation. A difficult social psychological 
factor is likely to be the loss of economic front-runner status, which was highly prized in the Czech 
Republic. Havel’s invective is also instructive in this regard, because he calls for a moral orientation in 
Czech politics going far beyond purely economic interests (FAZ 10 December 1997). 
48 Primarily the sale of corporate units and interests in firms, and the intensified search for strategic 
partners in the West (Handelsblatt 6 October 1998 on the sale of Škoda Pilsen subsidiaries for debt 
repayment purposes). 
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recently intensified their censure of inadequate institutional reforms, particularly in the 
key area of corporate governance. It is not yet clear whether such an externally provoked 
shift in policy indicates a shift in attitude on the part of the political and economic elites. 
Nevertheless, there is some sign that greater emphasis will be placed on the 
internationalisation component in restructuring. However, given the currently weak 
negotiating position, it is questionable whether the central goal of comprehensively 
safeguarding industrial competence—as in the case of the Škoda Auto privatisation—can 
be achieved. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Especially with developments in local industry in mind, the example of Škoda shows that 
internationalisation has been a key element in successful change. In facing global 
competition, it was vitally important that Škoda’s partner in cooperation not only had the 
necessary financial resources but also disposed of networked knowledge and relations, 
and that restructuring was broadly based on this principle—from product development 
to production system, including intercompany structures.  
A second, equally important aspect, which gave the lie to the notion of a ‘sell-out’ of 
domestic industry to foreign investors, was the preservation of regional embeddedness 
and the safeguarding of fundamental competence resources through cooperation. Even 
though preconditions for the Škoda-VW project had been particularly good, and the 
partners’ interests very largely congruent, institutional embeddedness still proved 
indispensable for the long-term maintenance of regional ties in their qualitative 
substance. One reason why the project survived even major crises and conflicts is 
doubtless the high strategic objectives of both parties to the joint venture. These 
objectives provided an effective framework for negotiating arrangements and 
compromises between the two parties, making flexible adjustment possible without 
endangering the basic balance of interests. In other words, this framing established a 
mechanism that prevented often very conflictual demands from provoking an either-or 
conflict.  
Two other factors also made an important contribution to this outcome: first, cultural 
commonalities, especially on the subject of production and technology (high regard for 
technical and scientific standards), and, second, confidence, growing in the process and 
engendered by the technical and economic successes attained, that Škoda would largely 
achieve the development goals that had been set. Škoda’s greater willingness to accept 
trade-offs and the shift from a closed-national identification stance to a national-
international posture as a member company of the VW Group is to be understood in this 
broader context.  
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As far as the national transformation regime is concerned, the Czech approach of weak 
to absent industrial policy governance produced a wide gap between the international 
and domestic sectors. It hindered potentially broader spillover effects and intersectoral 
links in the region from developing adequately or at all. Not only is the consequent gap 
between the two areas of the economy wide and have disparities grown: this regional 
structural deficit has also had the unwanted effect of intensifying the trend among locally 
established international firms towards external orientation. Overall, this shows how 
much the dynamization of existing resources and potential depends on interaction 
between transformation agents and on the creation of equivalent structures that make 
intercompany exchanges possible in the first place and which work towards fulfilling the 
new prerequisite of more comprehensive ‘cooperation platforms.’ 
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